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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joan Michelle Anderson appeals by permission from the district court's
order denying her motion to dismiss.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The marriage between Anderson and her husband Ricky J. Anderson
(hereinafter "Ricky") ended in divorce.

(Exhibits, p. 2.1)

The Montana court

issuing the divorce found that both parents were "fit and proper" persons to have
their child, P.A., and that both enjoyed a "close relationship and bond" with the
child. (Exhibits, p. 2.) The court found allegations by Anderson that Ricky was
abusive to P.A. to be "unsubstantiated" and declared itself "highly suspicious of
manipulation" by Anderson. (Exhibits, pp. 2-3.)
As part of the divorce the Montana court implemented a parenting plan as
in the best interests of the child. (Exhibits, p. 4.) The parenting plan assigned
rights equally to each parent in areas such as access to the child's records,
consultation with health and school officials, and to be notified of any emergency.
(Exhibits, p. 11.) The plan also set a residential schedule with P.A. residing
"primarily" with Anderson but living with Ricky one week every month. (Exhibits,
p. 11.) It established hours for telephone contact and a schedule for holidays.
(Exhibits, pp. 12-14.) Ricky was required to maintain health insurance for P.A.

Exhibits are included in the record in an electronic format, with the file name
"exhibits. pdf." For ease of reference, cited page numbers are to the pages of the
electronic file.
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(Exhibits, pp. 14-15.)

Each parent was granted "equal and independent

authority" regarding decisions about school, health care and emergencies.
(Exhibits, p. 15.) The parents were assigned alternating years for claiming the
child as a dependant for tax purposes.

(Exhibits, p. 16.)

Anderson was

designated the custodian of P.A. "solely for the purposes of all other State and
Federal statutes that require a registration or determination of custody but the
designation may not affect either parent's rights and responsibilities under the
parenting plan." (Exhibits, p. 16.)
About two weeks after the divorce decree was entered Anderson, who
was living in Idaho, took P.A. to California rather than deliver him to Ricky as
required by the parenting plan.

(R., pp. 23-24, 304-06.)

After a preliminary

hearing a magistrate bound Anderson over on one count of kidnapping. (R., pp.
23-24.) Thereafter the state charged Anderson by information with one count of
kidnapping for keeping P.A. away from Ricky for approximately three months.
(R., pp. 25-26.)

Anderson moved to dismiss the information "on the basis that the
kidnapping charge cannot be pursued under Idaho law as the mother is the
custodial parent of the minor child." (R., p. 296.) The district court denied the
motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 308-09, 314-21.) This Court granted permission to
appeal the interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss.

(Order Granting

Motion for permissive Appeal (August 11, 2011 ).) Anderson filed a timely appeal.
(R., pp. 345-47.)
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ISSUES
In its August 11, 2011 Order Granting Motion for Permissive Appeal this
Court defined the issue as:

"[W]hether a parent with visitation rights is a

custodial parent under I.C. § 18-4501."
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ARGUMENT
Ricky Was A Custodial Parent For Purposes Of The Kidnapping Statute
A.

Introduction
The district court held that Ricky did have custodial rights in P.A. and that

Anderson therefore had taken P.A. from a custodial parent. (R., pp. 314-15.) On
appeal Anderson argues the district court erred, first contending that taking a
child from the parent with the lesser custody rights is not kidnapping.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-18.) This argument is without merit. Ricky had superior
custody rights to all other persons at the time Anderson took P.A. to California.
Anderson next argues that the legislature intended that her crime be child
custody interference to the exclusion of kidnapping. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1825.) Although Anderson's crime certainly fits within the definition of child custody
interference, Anderson has failed to show legislative intent that a parent be
necessarily excluded from the kidnapping statute under circumstances present in
this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss an information is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 817, 10 P.3d
1285, 1286 (2000); State v. Keetch, 134 Idaho 327,329-30, 1 P.3d 828, 830-31
(Ct. App. 2000).

The interpretation and construction of a statute present

questions of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v.
Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140
Idaho 404,405,94 P.3d 709,710 (Ct. App. 2004).

4

C.

Taking A Child From A Parent With Custodial Rights In The Form Of
Visitation Is Kidnapping
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative

intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207,210,76 P.3d 951,954 (2003). Because "the
best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).

Where the statutory language is

unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable
interpretation, it is the court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d _,2011

WL 5375192, at *6 (Idaho, Nov. 9, 2011) (not yet released for publication)
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous
meaning of statute if such was "palpably absurd").
When the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable
construction, however, it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Oist.
No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006).

Consistent with the

primary objective of statutory interpretation, an ambiguous statute (one capable
of more than one reasonable construction) must be construed to mean what the
legislature intended it to mean.

19.:. To ascertain legislative intent, the court must

examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of
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the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history.

Id.

Further, fundamental principles of statutory interpretation and

construction require the Court to construe statutes so that effect is given to every
word, clause and sentence of the statute, Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365,
128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005), and to construe statutes relating to the same subject
matter together to further legislative intent, State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382,
987 P.2d 290,294 (1999).
The plain language of the kidnapping statute includes Anderson's conduct.
"Every person who wilfully: ... Leads, takes, entices away or detains a child
under the age of sixteen (16) years, with intent to keep or conceal it from its
custodial parent, guardian or other person having lawful care or control thereof ...
is guilty of kidnaping." I.C. § 18-4501 (2) (spelling original). Under the facts of
this case there is no doubt that Ricky was a "custodial parent, guardian or other
person having lawful care or control" of P.A. at the time Anderson took P.A. to
California and kept him from his father for months.
Anderson argues Ricky was not a "custodial parent." Idaho has defined
"custodial parent" for purposes of the Idaho Safe Haven Act as "the parent with
whom the child resides" absent some court decree stating otherwise. I.C. § 398202. Under Idaho law "joint custody" results from "an order awarding custody of
the minor child or children to both parents and providing that physical custody
shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child or children of
frequent and continuing contact with both parents."

I.C. § 32-717B(1). "Joint

physical custody" results from "an order awarding each of the parents significant
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periods of time in which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision
of each of the parents," I.C. § 32-7178(2), while "joint lega/ custody" results from
a "judicial determination that the parents or parties are required to share the
decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority relating to the health,
education and general welfare of a child," I.C. § 32-7178(3).
Review of the Montana divorce decree shows unmistakably that Anderson
and Ricky had joint custody of P.A. The parenting plan incorporated into the
decree established a "residential schedule" under which P.A. would "reside
primarily with" Anderson but that Ricky would "have parenting time one week per
month" until P.A. started school, at which time the "parenting time" would be "two
weekends per month" during school with summers divided equally. (Exhibits, p.
11.) 8y setting up residency on a three-quarters time with mom and one-quarter
time with dad, the divorce decree established joint physical custody as defined by
Idaho law.

I.C. § 32-7178(2).

The parenting plan also granted "equal and

independent authority" regarding decisions about school, health care and
emergencies. (Exhibits, p. 15.) The decree thus established joint legal custody
as well. I.C. § 32-7178(3).
Anderson places much emphasis on her designation as custodian
(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14), but she was declared custodian "solely for the
purposes of all other State and Federal statutes that require a registration or
determination of custody but the designation may not affect either parent's rights
and responsibilities under the parenting plan." (Exhibits, p. 16.) Her status as
custodian was therefore joint except as required by registration or other
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circumstances where only one parent could be designated as the custodian.
Such did not give Anderson the right to deprive Ricky of physical or legal custody
of P.A. as granted in the divorce decree. At all times relevant to this case Ricky
had joint physical and legal custody of P.A. At the time Anderson took P.A. to
California and each week P.A. would have been residing in Ricky's home under
the decree, Ricky had physical custody rights to P.A. superior to Anderson's, and
at all times they both enjoyed joint legal custody. Under the facts of this case,
Ricky was a custodial parent.
Anderson argues the word "custodial" is ambiguous because it could
mean "legal custody, physical custody, joint custody, sole custody, temporary
custody, or permanent custody."

(Appellant's brief, p. 17 (internal quotation

marks omitted).) She then invokes the rule of lenity and notice requirements of
due process to generally claim that therefore the statute does not apply to her.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) This argument is without merit.
First, the statute is not ambiguous. That there are many types of custody
does not make the term "custodial parent" ambiguous.

Indeed, a custodial

parent is one with any of the custody rights listed by Anderson. In fact, Ricky
was vested with them all on the weeks P.A. was living under his roof.

Even

though he did not possess exclusive custody rights at a/l times, such does not
render the word "custodial" ambiguous.
Second, the rule of lenity does not apply. The rule of lenity applies only if
a criminal statute still remains ambiguous after applying all other rules of
statutory construction. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116, 121
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(2001); State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). "[T]he
rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose,
there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the
Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended."
Thomas, _

Barber v.

U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

Thus, the mere "grammatical possibility of a defendant's

interpretation does not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the interpretation
proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible reading of the [legislative]
purpose." Abbott v. U.S., _

U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010) (internal

quotations omitted). Anderson's whole argument for ambiguity is that there are
several different types of custody. There is no reason to believe the legislature
did not include them all.

She has failed to make a credible argument for

ambiguity and application of the rule of lenity.
Third, there are no due process problems with the statute. The void-forvagueness doctrine rests upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982); State
v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). A statute is void for
vagueness if it (1) "fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence
concerning the conduct it proscribes," or (2) "fails to establish minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." Korsen, 138
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Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58
(1983); Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984); State v.
Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001)). There is simply nothing
constitutionally vague about the word "custodial."
Finally, Anderson's argument proves too much. If Anderson were right,
and Ricky were not a custodial parent, then it would not be kidnapping for a third

person other than Anderson to lure P.A. away from Ricky with intent to conceal
him from Ricky.

If Ricky is a custodial parent for purposes of a stranger

kidnapping, then the plain language of the statute also makes Anderson's actions
kidnapping because she "[took] ... a child ... with intent to keep ... [him] from [his]
custodial parent." I.C. § 18-4501 (2).

Interpreting the statute as advocated by

Anderson is both contrary to the plain language of the statute and would
effectively mean that Idaho's kidnapping statute does not generally apply
whenever a child is taken from a parent with mere "visitation" rights.
In addition, during the periods of mandated visitation Ricky had superior
rights of custody to even Anderson under the divorce decree.

Anderson

therefore took P.A. "with intent to ... conceal [him] from ... [a] person having
lawful care or control thereof."

I.C. § 18-4501 (2). State v. Chapman, 108 Idaho

841, 843, 702 P.2d 879, 881 (Ct. App. 1985) ("the mere fact that the custodial
right was temporary does not bar the charge of kidnapping against anyone,
including the other parent") (Bakes, C.J. of the Idaho Supreme Court, with
McFadden, J. of the Idaho Supreme Court sitting in special panel).
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Under the plain language of the statute a person commits kidnapping
when she takes a child with intent to conceal that child from a person with
superior legal rights of custody. The evidence in this case shows that Anderson
did just that when she took P.A. to California rather than allow P.A.'s father to
exercise his custody rights as granted by the divorce decree.

D.

That Anderson's Conduct Was Also Child Custody Interference Did Not
Prevent Her From Being Charged With Kidnapping
The issue this Court granted permission to appeal was "whether a parent

with visitation rights is a custodial parent under I.C. § 18-4501." (Order Granting
Motion for permissive Appeal (August 11, 2011).) As shown above, Ricky was a
custodial parent for purposes of the kidnapping statute.

In her brief Anderson

also argues that she should have been charged with child custody interference,
not kidnapping, and therefore the prosecutor abused his charging discretion.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-25.) This Court did not grant permission to appeal any
challenge to the state's charging discretion. This issue is therefore not properly
before this Court.
Even if this question were properly before this Court, no abuse of
discretion has been shown. "Where the facts legitimately invoke more than one
statute, a prosecutor is vested with a wide range of discretion in deciding what
crime to prosecute." LaBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59, 63 (Ct.
App. 1989) (prosecutor did not abuse discretion by charging lewd conduct where
facts also supported a charge of incest). See also State v. Folsom, 139 Idaho
627, 630-31, 84 P.3d 563, 566-67 (Ct. App. 2003) (prosecutor did not abuse
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discretion by charging felony abandonment of vulnerable adult instead of
misdemeanor neglect of an adult); State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 12,27 P.3d
417, 421 (Ct. App. 2001) (prosecutor did not abuse discretion by charging, under
overlapping conspiracy statutes, conspiracy that that did not impose mandatory
minimum for trafficking, and state was therefore bound by that choice); State v.
Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 616-17, 977 P.2d 228, 230-31 (Ct. App. 1998)
(prosecutor did not abuse discretion by charging trafficking instead of possession
with intent to deliver).

Mere statutory overlap does not remove the charging

decision from prosecutorial discretion. Folsom, 139 Idaho at 630-31, 84 P.3d at
566-67. Only where application of rules of statutory interpretation shows that the
legislature intended certain acts to be prosecuted under a particular statute and
not another will the Court find an abuse of discretion. See State v. Barnes, 133
Idaho 378, 381-82, 987 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1999) (finding that two statutes
applied but no legislative intent to make crime of driving a snowmobile on a road
under the influence an infraction rather than a misdemeanor).

Anderson has

failed to show an abuse of charging discretion because both the kidnapping and
the child custody interference statutes legitimately apply to her conduct.
Anderson argues that the doctrine of in pari materia prevents the
kidnapping statute from applying to her case (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-25),
applying the doctrine in two mutually inconsistent ways (compare Appellant's
brief, pp. 19-20 (child custody interference statute "indicates a legislative intent to
protect the rights of parents not included under Idaho's Kidnapping statute") with
Appellant's

brief,pp.

21-23

(child

custody

12

interference

statute

"is

an

acknowledgment that a parent taking

a child from

another parent is

fundamentally different than when a child is abducted by a complete stranger").
Application of the in pari materia doctrine does not show any legislative intent to
remove prosecutorial charging discretion in relation to crimes that fall within both
the kidnapping and the child custody interference statutes.
The in pari materia doctrine was applied by the Idaho Supreme Court to
find no abuse of prosecutorial discretion in Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290.
Barnes was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence for driving a
snowmobile on the road while intoxicated.

kL

at 379-80, 987 P.2d at 291-92.

Barnes argued that because there was an infraction statute specifically dealing
with operating a snowmobile under the influence, she could only be charged with
the infraction and not the misdemeanor.

kL at 381-82,

987 P.2d at 293-94. The

Court reasoned that although the snowmobile statute was more specific than the
DUI statute in relation to the type of vehicle, the DUI statute was more specific in
relation to operation on roads.

kL at 382,

987 P.2d at 294. Because operating a

snowmobile on a road legitimately fell within the purview of both statutes, the
prosecutor had discretion to charge under either.

kL at 382-84,

987 P.2d at 294-

96.
The section of the kidnapping statute at issue this case applies to a
"person who willfully .. , [I]eads, takes, entices away or detains a child under the
age of sixteen (16) years, with intent to keep or conceal it from its custodial
parent, guardian or other person having lawful care or control thereof." I.C. § 184501 (2). The relevant portion of the child custody interference statute applies
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when a "person ... intentionally and without lawful authority:

Takes, entices

away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent or another person or
institution having custody, joint custody, visitation or other parental rights,
whether such rights arise from temporary or permanent custody order, or from
the equal custodial rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order .... "
I.C. § 18-4506(1 )(a).

Secondary differences include that the section of the

kidnapping statute applies only to children under 16 while the child custody
interference statute applies to all minors. The primary difference between these
statutes, however, is that kidnapping requires specific "intent to keep or conceal"
the child while it is enough under the child custody interference statute to merely
"withhold[]" regardless of intent. Thus, a person who interferes with visitation or
other custodial rights without intent to keep or conceal the child commits only
child custody interference.
Anderson is correct when she argues that the child custody interference
statute "indicates a legislative intent to protect the rights of parents not included
under Idaho's Kidnapping statute."

(Appellant's brief, p. 19.)

That the child

custody interference is broader and less specific indicates that the legislature did
not intend to exclude from the kidnapping statute all takings of children that
interfere with custodial rights. Indeed, because the illegal taking of a child for any
length of time will necessarily interfere with somebody's custodial rights, it only
makes sense that the legislature intended both statutes to be fully applicable
where the facts of the crime justify the charge.

14

To hold that the child taking

portion of the kidnapping statute applies only where there is no child custody
interference is to nUllify that portion of the kidnapping statute.
In this regard the analysis of the Idaho Court of Appeals in Folsom, 139
Idaho 627, 84 P.3d 563, is instructive. In that case Folsom argued that he should
have been charged with neglect of a vulnerable adult instead of the far more
serious charge of abandonment of a vulnerable adult because the charged acts
necessarily involved neglect.

The court of appeals "decline[d] to presume a

redundancy between entire statutes," and therefore declined to "read the
abandonment statute as but another expression of the exploitation, abuse and
neglect statute."

kl

at 630, 84 P.3d at 566. Rather, the latter statute was "a

consistent (if overlapping) expression of a legislative desire to shield vulnerable
adults from all manner of mistreatment."

kl

"When in the event of such overlap

an action could be charged under either statute, prosecutorial discretion will
control the charging decision."

kl

Here there is clear overlap between the two statutes.

All actions that

constitute kidnapping of a child to conceal him or her from a custodial parent,
guardian or other person with lawful care or control will necessarily interfere with
child custody rights. Not all actions that interfere with child custody rights will,
however, constitute kidnapping. Thus, there is clear legislative intent to provide
overlapping protections against those who would take or entice a child away from
someone with legal custody. Such overlap requires the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in making charging decisions.
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Anderson's argument that the

legislature intended no crimes that interfere with child custody rights be charged
as kidnapping is without merit.
Finally, the legislative history supports the conclusion that the legislature
intended the kidnapping and child custody interference statutes to overlap and to
work together.

The testimony before the House Judiciary, Rules and

Administration Committee indicates the child custody interference bill, H135, was
to address '''gray area' in the existing statute" and assure that when a parent or
other person did interfere with custody rights, federal agents (who could only act
if the crime was a felony) could be enlisted to help find any child taken out of the
state. (House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee Minutes (2/13/87)
(attached as Appendix A).) The Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee Minutes
include a legal memorandum by a Deputy Attorney General. (Senate Judiciary
and Rules Committee Minutes (3/6187) (attached as Appendix B).)

That

memorandum noted the 1985 amendment to the kidnapping statute (to add the
word "custodial") took the "important step" of making the kidnapping statute
applicable to parents who take their own children in violation of custody orders.
(Appendix B (Memorandum, p. 2).) The kidnapping statute, however, does not
"fully address the problem of custodial interference." (Id.) Making child custody
interference a felony would also bring more acts within the scope of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, allowing federal officials to aid state officials
in locating taken children. (Id.)
The minutes of the hearings on the child custody interference bill thus
suggest that the legislature was looking for a way to supplement the existing
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kidnapping law as it applied to children, not supplant it.

That the legislature

wished to give the state, and parents, more options in protecting rights and
tracking down taken children shows the legislature did not intend to limit
prosecutorial charging discretion.
The state could have charged Anderson with child custody interference.
That it could have does not show that it abused its discretion by charging
kidnapping.

Because both statutes legitimately apply to Anderson's conduct,

which crime to charge was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Anderson has failed to show error in the district court's order refusing dismissal
of this case. 2

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying dismissal with prejudice.

DATED this 30th day of December, 2011.

The state further notes that dismissal with prejudice is not an appropriate
remedy, because such may bar any subsequent prosecution (and would almost
certainly foster additional litigation on this point). If the proper charge is child
custody interference, the state would request an opportunity to amend or file new
charges.
2
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APPENDIX A

HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES & ADMINISTRATION COMMMITTEE
MINUTES
Friday, February 13, 1987, 1:30 p.m.
GUESTS

See attached list.
The meeting
All members
tives Lloyd
Rep. Lowder

was called to order by Chairman Loveland at the appointed time.
of the Committee were present with the exception of Representaand Giovanelli. Mr. John Pino sat.in for Rep. McDermott and
sat in for Rep. Bengson.

Rep. Deckard moved for approval of the minute s of the February 11, 1987,
meeting, seconded by Rep. Hartung. The motion carried.
RS13202C2

H135

Mr. Richard Cade explained the changes which were made in some of the wording and after a short discussion it was moved by Rep. Herndon, seconded by
Rep. Deckard that RS13202C2 be introduced for printing. Upon being put to
a vote the motion carried.
Rep. Child ers introduced this legislation which he indicated had been prepared with considerable input from the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association.
He also distributed copies of a memorandum which had been prepared by Pat Kole
of the Attorney General's office. This memorandum provides detail of the
"gray area " in the eXisting statute . Among other things, the proposed sta tute
makes the offense of parental kidnapping a felony, making it possible for the
state to enlist the assistance of federal investigative resources in tracking
down parents who are in violation.
After some disctBsiln it wa s moved by Rep . Herndon, seconded by Rep. Si mp s on,
tha t H135 be sent to the floor with a "do pass" recommendation. The notion
carried.

H134

After a short presentation by Rep. Montgomery and there being no questions from
the Committee, it was moved by Rep. Montgomery, seconded by Rep. Hay, that H134
be sent to the floor with a "do pass" recommendation. The motion carried. Rep .
Montgomery will sponsor the bill.

H121

Rep. Hay advised the Committee that the main purpose of this legislation was
to insure that doctors who make alcoholism evaluations are persons who qualify
to make these evaluations . She went on to say that the Idaho Medical Association
has no problem with this requirement, which is needed to strengthen the law.
After some discussion it was moved by Rep. Simpson, seconded by Rep. Herndon,
that H121 be sent to the floor with a "do pass " recommendation. The motion
carried. Rep. Hay will sponsor.

RS20177

This item on the agenda was not addressed because Mr. Pat Kole, Attorney
General's office, who was to present it to the Committee, had been detained
and was not in attendance .
There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting
was adjourned by Chairman Loveland at 2:55 p.m.

'DON C. LOVEcAND, CHAI&~
/

APPENDIX B

MINUTES
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE
Friday
March 6, 1987

1:30 P.M.
Room 426

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Senators Fairchild, Darrington, Rydalch, Staker,
Anderson, Bray, Reed, Wetherell, Brooks

MEMBERS EXCUSED:

Senators Risch and McRoberts

VISITORS

Rich Randall, Fire Fighter
Robert Kiernan, Fire Marshall
Lynn Nokes, Fire Fighter
Alan Wolfe, Realtor
Representat~ve Mary Hartung
Representative Phil Childers
Olivia Craven, Corrections Department

Chairman Fairchild called the meeting to order at 1:45 P.M., in
Room 426, and noted that a quorum was present.
Moved by Senator Bray, second by Senator Reed, that the minutes
of March 4, 19~7, be approved as presented. On a voice vote, the
motion passed.

H 58

To make it clear that city police and other
police officers have the authority to go beyond
their geographical jurisdictional boundaries
while in fresh pursuit - Representative Hartung
gave a brief presentation of the bill, noting
full support of the cities and counties, and
responded to questions from the floor.

MOTION

Moved by Senator Wetherell, second by Senator
Darrington, that H 58 be sent to the floor with
a DO PASS ~COMMENDATION. On a voice vote, the
motion passed.
NAY: Senator Staker
ABSENT: Senators R~sch and McRoberts
SPONSOR: Senator Wetherell

H 135

To provide a definition of child custody and
visitation and to provide penalties for
violation - Representative Childers gave a
brief presentation and introduced Mr. Allen
Wolfe for a personal case history to show how
the bill would be helpful.
He then responded
to questions.

Minutes
Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee
March 6, 198}
Page 2
MOTION

Moved by Senator Bray, second by Senator
Rydalch, that H 135 be sent to the floor
with a DO PASS R~COMMENDATION. On a voice
vote, the motion passed.
Absent: Senators Risch and McRoberts
Sponsor: Senator Fairchild

S 1176

This legislation provides for civil action
for malicious harassment. Senator Reed
briefly reiterated the merits of the bill
and opened her presentation for discussion.

MOTION

Moved by Senator Reed, second by Senator
Bray, that S 1176 be sent to the floor with
a DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. On a voice vote,
the motion passed.
Absent: Senators Risch and McRoberts
Sponsor: Senator Reed

S 1162

Chairman Fairchild inv ~ted Pat Kole of the
Attorney General~ office to present the bill,
section by section, to the committee. Mr.
Kole then responded to questions.

Chairman Fairchild excused himself form committee at the end
of Mr. Koles presentation. Vice Chairman Darrington assumed
controle of the meeting and with the instruction of Chairman
Fairchild, invited Olivia Craven of the Corrections Department
to address the committee regarding S 1162.
MOTION

Moved by Senator Staker, second by Senator
Bray, that S 1162 be HELD IN COMMITTEE
On a roll call vote, the motion passed.
AYE: Senators Staker, Bray, Wetherell and
Brooks
NAY: Senators Darr~ngton, Rydalch and
Anderson
ABSENT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed and
Fairchild

RS 20316C2

To provide a new section in Idaho Code,
Chapter ~, Title 18, titled Aggravated
Arson -Senator Bray made a brief presentation
and responded to quest~ons.

Minutes
senate Judiciary and Rules Committee
March 6, 1987
Page 3
MOTION

Moved by Senator Anderson, second by
Senator Brooks, that RS ~0316C~ be lntroduced for printing. No vote taken.

SUBSTITUTE
MOTION

Moved by Senator Staker, second by
Senator Wetherell, that RS 20J16e2 be
introduced for printing and sent to the
floor with a DO PASS RLCOMMENDATION at the
same time. On a roll call vote, the motion
passed.
AYE: Senators Staker, Bray, Wetherell, and
Brooks
NAY: Senators Darrington, Rydalch and
Anderson
ABSENT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed,
and Fairchild
SPONSOR: Senator Bray

HCR 3

Providing offset printing of House and
Senate bills, resolutions, memorials and
amendments, and flxing the price for same.
Senator Darrington made a brief presentation.

MOTION

Moved by Senator Anderson, second by Senator
Brooks, that HeR 3 be sent to the floor with
a DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. On a voice vote,
the motion passed.
ABSENT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed, and
Fairchild
SPONSOR: Senator Falrchild

HCR 16

Providing for printing the session laws,
fixing the price for printing same, and the
price the public shall be charged for copies.
Senator Darrlngton made a brief presentation.

MOTION

Moved by senator Anderson, second by senator
Bray, that HCR 16 be sent to the floor with
a DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. On a voice vote,
the motion passed.
ABSLNT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed, and
Fairchild
SPONSOR: Senator Fairchild

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned.
Respectfully submitted,

Minutes
Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee
March 6, 1987
Page 4

Lorna Auld, Secretary
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In response to a request for the drafting of a child custody
interference statute, this memorandum discusses the current Idaho
kidnapping statute, which was amended in 1985 to cover certain
parental kidnapping situations, and proposes two chi ld custody
interference statutes, both of which expressly apply to a wider
variety of custodial interference si tuations than those covered
under the kidnapping statute.
These versions are based upon
suggestions in law review articles and comparable laws from other
states.
I.

The Current Idaho Kidnapping Statute, Idaho Code § 18-4501

In 1985, Idaho Code § 18-4501 was amended by adding the word
"custodial" to subsection 2.
Now kidnapping under that subsection
is defined as:
Every person who willingly:
(2) leads,
takes, entices away or detains a child under
the age of sixteen (16) years, with intent
to keep or conceal it from its custodial
parent,
guardian or other person having
lawful care or control thereof ...
The offense is deemed second degree kidnapping if no ransom
is demanded, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison from
C'ne to twenty-five years.
Idaho Code § 18-4503.
Thus, a parent
~dy now be convicted of a felony offense for snatching his or her
chiJd from the parent or other person having lawful custody.

-

1 -

(

(

The statute was applied to convict a father of second-degree
kidnapping in State v. Chapman, 108 Idaho 841, 702 P.2d 879 (ct.
App. 1985), where the court held that temporary custody orders, as
well as permanent orders, were sufficient to give one parent
"lawful custody" of the child which the other parent may not
violate.
The kidnapping statute may be viewed as the least restrictive
means of dealing wi th custodial interference situations.
This
statute does make one important step.
By making the offense of
parental kidnapping a felony, the state may now enlist federal
investigative resources in tracking down parents who have violated
the statute and have taken the child to another state.
The
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
(PKPA)
expressly
directs the F.B.I. to aid states in which parental kidnapping is a
felony in locating and apprehending the absconding parent in
another state.
Making the crime a felony al so aids the state in
ob~ aining extradition of the parent from a sis
e.
·/

Although the statute makes this
even to protect temporary custody
\,
address the problem of cust·
. e
~y-n'fEerferen€Statut~ s

I

i..

II.

important step, and applies
orders, it does not full
fe ence a
necessa~~O~d~O.L--"'S~o~.,-.__- _ _--------

Factors to Consider in Drafting a Child Custody
Interference Statute
A.

Existence of a court order

While most state criminal custodial interference laws require
violation of a court order as an element of the offense, it has
been noted that many instances of parental kidnapping occur before
any court order has been entered.
More restrictive statutes, such
as the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes, have provisions which do
not require the existence of a court order, and specifically apply
to situations where a court action has been filed bringing child
custody into issue, but before any custody decree has been entered.
An Arizona case applied its state's custodial interference
statute to convict a woman who had aided a father in kidnapping
his child and taking the child to another state, even though no
custody order existed.
The court in State v. Donahue, 680 P.2d
191 (Ariz. App. 1984) held that in absence of a court order, the
father had at most a "coequal" right to custody, which he could
not exercise to exclude the mother .
The Arizona statute on which
the conviction was based provides:
A person commits custodial interference if,
knowing or having reason to know that he has
no
legal
right
to
do
so,
such person
knowingly
takes,
entices
or
keeps
from
lawful custody any child less than eighteen
years of age or incompetent, entrusted by
- 2 -

(

(

authori ty of law to the custody of another
person or institution.
(A.R.S. 13-1302A)
Because the Arizona statute does not expressly require a
violation of a court order, but more generally speaks to "lawful
custody" by "authority of law," such a court interpretation is
possible.
Idaho's legislature has also recogni2".ed parents' "coequal"
right of custody in their children.
Idaho Code § 32-1007 states
that:
"The father and mother of a legitimate unmarried minor
child
are
equally
entitled
to
its
custody,
services,
and
earnings. "
Thus,
a court in Idaho could construe a statute
similar to Arizona's statute as applying even in absence of a
court order.
But rather than creating a statute with vague terms
such as "lawful authority" which leaves the law open for varying
court interpretations, it might be better to expressly describe
situations to which the
statute
should apply,
such as the
Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes which apply once a court action
has been filed.
-~===----------------

B.

Violations by the Custodial Parent

One area which Idaho's current kidnapping
law does not
address is action by a custodial parent which might interfere with
the other parent's visitation or joint custody rights.
By
addressing the possible misconduct of a parent having legal
custody,
that parent is deterred from misusing his or her
.. custodial" status I
the rights of both parents are more fully
s cured, and disruption of a court ordered custody arrangement
be omes less likely.
Child Out

0

tate

Many state statutes treat intrastate child snatching as a
misdemeanor and interstate chi ld snatching as a felony _
States
are often reluctant to consider parental kidnapping a serious
crime because a parent's motives in snatching a child are often
based on the parent's honest belief that he or she is acting for
the welfare of the child.
Likewise, prosecutors often resist such
laws because they do not
d their limited resources by
handling what t
to be domestlc
"
es.
Despi te
th
object"
s, i t is necessary to consider the offense
y
obtain federal
lster state
ln
has
and
---..
usse
The resulting intrastate/interstate dichotomy can be seen as
and one that might be necessary to obtain
passage of such a law.
I f a kidnapping parent keeps a chi ld
wi thin the state borders, the danger of that parent permanently
keeping the child from the other parent is much less, and a court
resolution more likely_
Additionally, this dichotomy may serve as

.-..9- sensibJ..e... compromise4
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an incentive for a parent determined to snatch his or her child to
rernai n in the s ta te to ~ay;s.u'(~-£-E~*l:y--€H'l:a-~~h---____
A _ID
restrictive
statute,
however,
would
rec nize
ustodial interference as a serious crime even if the child
as
been kept in the state.
The primary evi 1 s to be prevented by a
custodial interference
law are disruptions of family livin
arrangements, the harmful effect such disruptions have on a child,
and the denial of the relative rights that each parent may have
regarding their children.
The fact that an absconding parent
in the state with the child does Ii ttle to mitigate the \
~~~~~~~~~·s~r~u~ptions.
/)
D.

Agents of Parents

A custodial interference statute should also expressly apply
to those persons acting as agents of a parent.
Those who help a
parent by taking the child or by intentionally withholding
information from the lawful custodian regarding the location of
the child may then be held accountable for their actions as well.
E.

Expenses Incurred in Locating Child

A few statutes allow for the recovery of expenses incurred by
the lawful custodian in locating and regaining custody of a child
taken in violation of the statute.
Such provisions are usually
enforced at the discretion of the judge or jury.
Oregon, for
example, provides that such expenses are "pecuniary damages for
purposes of restitution."
See O.R.S. § 163.245.
But Washington,
in comparison, provides that "any reasonable expenses incurred
shall be assessed against the defendant." R.C.W. 9A.40.080.
F.

Defenses and Mitigating Factors; Other Provisions

Following is a list of factors which states often consider as
providing a defense or mitigation to the crime of custodial
interference.
Depending on the particular statute, such factors
may constitute a complete defense to the crime,
lessen the
penalty, or reduce a felony to a misdemeanor:
1.

Child's
limit)

return

before

arrest

2.

Child's
return within
a
specified time
after the
expiration of an authorized visitation privilege (12, 24
hrs., etc.)

3.

Teenage child leaves lawful custodian without consent.

4.

Chi ld taken to protect the chi Id from imminent physical
harm (e.g., sexual abuse)

- 4 -

of

parent

(may

set

time

(

(

5.

Chi ld taken by a parent fleeing from imminent physical
harm to himself or herself

6.

Consent by lawful custodian

7.

Authorized by law

8.

Actor in good fai th gave notice to law enforcement or
juvenile authorities within a reasonable time after
taking child

Other notable provisions include:
9.

Detaining child outside the state for 72 hours is prima
facia evidence that person charged intended to violate
order at time of taking

10.

Subjecting the child to physical harm raises the offense
to a felony

III. Draft Statutes
Based on the effect of Idaho's current kidnapping statute and
the consideration of the various factors listed above, this
memorandum proposes two versions of a chi ld custody interference
law for Idaho.
A.

Most Restrictive Version

This version expressly states types of custodial rights
protected.
It applies not only to custody rights, but to joint
custody and visitation rights as well.
This statute also applies
whether or not a custody decree has been entered, and applies to
the situation where a court action has been filed but a custody
order has not been issued.
The defenses listed allow a person to take the child from a
lawful custodian if the child or that person is in imminent danger
of physical harm, and allow a 24-hour leeway for returning the
child after visitation privileges have expired.
The only penalty reduction occurs if the person taking the
child did not leave the state with the child, and returned the
child unharmed.
Thus, an intrastate offense is still a felony if
the person taking the child is arrested before he returns the
child.
If intrastate custody interference is considered a felony
until the child is returned, the apprehension of the person taking
the child will be given a higher priority by state law enforcement.
Reasonable costs incurred in locating the chi ld are mandatori ly
assessed against the defendant.
Child Custogy Interference Definedj Defensesj Punishment

- 5 -

c

(
1.

Any person, whether a parent or other,
or
agent
of
that
person,
who
intentionally
and
without
lawful
authority:
(a) takes, entices away
keeps or
wi thho Ids any minor chi Id from a
parent
or
other
person
or
insti tution having custody, joint
custody,
visitation
or
other
parental
rights,
whether
such
rights
arise
from
temporary or
permanent custody order, or from
the equal custodial rights of each
parent in the absence of a custody
order, or;
I

(b) takes
entices away, keeps or
withholds a minor child from a
parent after commencement of an
action
relating
to
child
visitation or custody but prior to
the
issuance
of
an
order
determining custody or visitation
rights; is guilty of child custody
interference.
I

2.

It shall be an affirmative defense to a
violation of subsection (1) that:
(a) the action is taken to protect
the child from imminent physical
harm;
(b)
the action
parent
fleeing
physical
harm
herself: or

is taken by a
from
imminent
to
himself
or

(c) the action is consented to by
the lawful custodian;
(d) the child is returned within
24 hours after expiration of an
authorized visitation privilege.
3.

A violation of SUbsection (1) shall be
a felony, unless the defendant did not
take the child outside the state, and
the
child
was
voluntarily
returned
unharmed
prior
to
the
defendant's
arrest,
in which case the violation
shall be reduced to a misdemeanor.
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(
4.

B.

Any reasonable expenses incurred by a
custodian
locating
or
in
lawful
attempting to locate a child taken in
violation of sUbsection (1 ) shall be
assessed against the defendant.

Less Restrictive Version

This version defines custodial interference in much the same
fashion as the Arizona statute.
Much simpler than the more
restrictive version, it does not expressly describe or list the
types of custodial rights protected.
Rights to visitation, for
example, are not expressly protected under this statute.
The
provided

interstate-felony/intrastate-misdemeanor distinction is
in this
statute,
and more defenses
are expressly
a~lowed.
Imposing costs on the defendant is left to the court's
di scretion.
Child Custody Interference Defined; Defenses; Penalties
1.

A person or agent
of
that person
commits
custodial
interference
if,
knowing or having reason to know that
he or she has no legal right to do so,
such person knowingly takes, entices or
keeps from lawful custody any minor
child entrusted by authority of law to
the
custody
of
another
person
or
institution.

2.

It is an affirmative defense that:
(a) prior to arrest and wi thin 30
days
of
committing
custodial
interference,
the
defendant
voluntarily
returns
the
child
unharmed;
(b) the action is taken to protect
the child from imminent physical
harmj
(c)
the action
fleeing
parent
harm
physical
herself;

is taken by a
from
imminent
to
himself
or

(d) the lawful custodian consented
to the action;
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( e) the chi ld is returned wi thi n
24 hours of the expiration of a
visitation privilegej
(f) the child, being at the time
more than fourteen years old, was
taken away at his or her own
instigation, without enticement.
3.

A violation of sUbsection (1) shall be
a misdemeanor,
unless the defendant
takes the child outside the state's
borders, in which case the violation is
a felony.

4.

expenses
by
Reasonable
incurred
a
locating
lawful
custodian
in
or
attempting to locate a child taken in
violation of subsection ( 1 ) may be
assessed against the defendant at the
court's discretion.

- 8 -
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ro:

PAT KOLE

FROM:

TIM KELLY

DATE:

February 20, 1987

RE:

SURVEY OF CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE LAWS

Enclosed in Appendix A, you will find a synopsis of state
laws, except Idaho's, concerning custodial interference, or a
simi lar crime.
In response to your direct query, how many states
puni sh custodial interference or a simi lar crime as a felony,
whether interstate or intrastate, there are (21).
This amounts to
about 42% of the states.
Therefore,
the scheme of felony
punishment for both degrees of custodial interferences constitutes
a plurality.
If further information is needed,
contact me.
TK/mkf
Enclosure

.

please do not hesitate to

APPENDIX A

TABLE OF CRIMINAL STATUTES; PROVISIONS AS OF FEBRUARY. 1987
ALA. CODE, TITLE 13A, SECTION 6-45

Custodial interference is a felony, but if the actor is trying
to regain lawful custody, there is no offense committed.
ALASKA STAT. SECTIONS 11.41.320, 11.41.330

Custodial interference in first degree, intrastate disposition,
is a felony; otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. SECTION 13-1302

Custodial interference is a felony unless the child is returned
unharmed prior to actor's arrest,
in which case it is a
misdemeanor.
Arizona also provides that a perpetrator besides a
parent committing the offense is guilty of a felony.
ARK. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 41-2415, 41-2416

Interference with custody is a felony if the child is taken out
of the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
Notwithstanding,
for these provi sions to be pliable, a contempt citation must
have been ignored for (90) days.
CAL. PENAl, CODE, SECTIONS 278, 278.5

Child abduction by a person having no right is a felony.
violation of a custody decree is a felony.

Any

COLO. REV. STAT. SECTIONS 18-3-304

Violation of custody
affirmative defense.

is

a

felony.

Child

in

danger

is

an

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 53a-97, 53a-98

Interstate
custodial
interference
is a
misdemeanor,
intrastate custodial interference is a felony.

-

1 -

while

DEL. CODE TITLE 11, SECTION 785

Interference wi th custody
removed from the state.

is

a

misdemeanor,

unless

child

is

FLA. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 787.03, 787.04

Custodial interference within the state is a misdemeanor, while
custodial interference in violation of a court order, or taking
the child out of state is a felony.
GA. CODE ANN. SECTION 16-5-45

Interference with custody is a felony if the child is removed
from the state, and likewise if the child is not removed from
the state.
IlAWAII REV. STAT. SECTIONS 707-726, 707-727

Custodial interference is a felony if the child is removed from
the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor. However, violation of
a court order pertaining to custody is a felony.
ILL. ANN. STATE. CHAPTER 38, SECTION 10-5

Custodial interference of any degree is a felony.
It is no
10nger an affirmative defense if the child is returned wi thin
(72) hours after removal.
IND. CODE ANN. SECTION 35-42-3-B

Like Illinois, custodial interference of any degree is a felony.
IOWA CODE ANN. SECTION 710.6

Violating a custody order by concealing
state, or in the state, is a felony.

a

child

out

RAN. STAT. SECTION 21-3422

Custodial interference, aggravated or not, is a felony.

- 2 -

of

the

KY. REV. STAT. SECTION 509.070
custodial interference by a parent is a felony.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. SECTION 14.45.1
Custodial interference is a misdemeanor, unless the chi ld is
removed from the state, upon which it is a felony.
Costs of
returning child to proper jurisdiction can be assessed against
defendant.

ME. REV. STAT. TITLE 17-A, SECTION 303
Criminal restraint by a parent is a felony.

MD. ANN. CODE.

FAMILY LAW, SECTIONS 9-301-9-304

Custodial interference is a misdemeanor, unless the child is
removed from the state.
An interesting affirmative defense is
provided for.
If the child is in danger, and the abductor
submits to jurisdiction of a court within (96) hours to modify
custody, then custodial interference has not been committed.

MASS. GEN LAWS. ANN. CHAPTER 265 SECTION 26A
Kidnapping by a relative in violation of a custody order is a
mi sdemeanor unless the chi ld is taken out of state or put in
danger, in which case it is a felony.

MICH. STAT. ANN. SECTION 750.178
Concealment from a proper guardian or parent is a felony.

MINN. STAT. ANN. SECTION 609.26
Violation f a custody order is a felony.
The court may assess
costs incurred by lawful custodian in obtaining custody.

MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 97-3-51
Interstate removal of a child by a non-custodial
relative is a felony, as is intrastate removal.

- 3 -

parent

or

MO.

ANN. STAT. SECTION 565.150

Interference with custody is a misdemeanor unless the child is
removed from state in which case it is a felony.
MO~.

REV. CODES ANN. SECTION 45-5-304

Custodial interference is a felony.
NEB. REV. STATE. SECTION 28-316
Vio1ation of the natural custody rights of the legal custodian
is
a misdemeanor, but violation of the court's decree is a
felony.
NEV. REV. STAT. SECTION 200.359
Vio1ation of a court's custody decree is a misdemeanor.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. SECTION 633:4
Interference with custody is a felony if the child is taken out
of
the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
Affirmative
defenses are nullified if the child is taken out of state.
N.J. STAT. ANN. SECTION 2C: 13-4
Interference with custody by a parent or third party is a felony.
N.M. STAT. ANN. SECTION 30-4-4
Custodial interference by removal of a child from the state is a
felony.
N.Y.

[PENAL] SECTIONS 135.45, 135.50

Custodial interference is a felony if the child is in danger or
taken from the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor .

•
N.C. GEN. STAT. SECTION 14-320.1
It is a felony to transport a child out of state in violation of
a custody order.
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N.D. CENT. CODE SECTION 14-14-22.1

It is a felony to transport a child out of state in violation of
a custody order.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. SECTIONS 2905.04, 2919.23
I

Child stealing by a parent is a felony, if the child is removed
from the state, otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
Interference
with a custody decree is a misdemeanor.
OKLA. STATE. ANN . TITLE 21, SECTION 891

Child stealing is a felony.
OR. REV. STAT. SECTIONS 163.245, 163 . 257

Both degrees of custodial interference are felonies.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SECTION 2904

Interference with custody by a parent or third party is a felony
if child is taken out of state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
R . I. GEN. LAWS, SECTION 11-26- 1.1

Child snatching is a felony.
S . C. CODE SECTION 16-17-495

Violation of a custody order by
state is a felony.

transporting

a

child

out

of

S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. SECTIONS 22-19 - 9, 22-19-10

Interference with custody is a
conviction thereof is a felony.
also a felony.

misdemeanor, but upon second
Removing child from state is

TENN. CODE ANN. SECTIONS 39-2-301, 39-2-303

Concealment of a child is a felony, while actually kidnapping of
one's own child is not considered a felony.

-
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[PENAL] CODE ANN. TITLE 6, SECTION 25.03

Interference with custody is a
from the state.

felony if the child is removed

urrAH CODE ANN. SECTION 76-5-303

Interference with custody, including visitation rights by either
a parent or a third party is a misdemeanor, but if the child is
removed from the state is a felony.
VT. STAT. ANN. TITLE 13, SECTION 2451

Custodial
interferences
resulting
in
either
dispositions or intrastate dispositions are felonies.

interstate

VA. CODE SECTION 18.2-47

Custodial interference is a misdemeanor.
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. SECTIONS 9A.40.060"

9A.40.070

Custodial interference if the child is not removed from the
state is a misdemeanor, otherwise it is a felony.
However, a
second conviction for instate custodial interference is a felony.
W.VA. CODE SECTION 61-2-14d

Concealment or removal of a minor child from
felony: interstate or intrastate.

custodian

is

a

WIS. STAT. ANN. SECTION 946.71

Interference with custody is a felony if the chi ld is removed
from the state, or held over (12) hours in state.
WYO. STAT. SECTION 6-2-204

Interference with custody is a felony.
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